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Japan's Retreat from Reverse
Engineering: An
Unnecessary Surrender
Crystal D. Talley*
Introduction
In July, 1993, the Japanese Agency of Cultural Affairs formed an advisory
committee to reevaluate the status of Japanese copyright protection for
computer software.' In response to two United States Circuit Court deci-
sions2 and recently adopted European Community legislation,3 the Japa-
nese Council for Examination and Research suggested relaxing copyright
protection laws to permit decompilation, 4 a type of reverse engineering. 5
* Crystal D. Talley graduated from Southwest Missouri State University with a
degree in Philosophy and Political Science in 1993. She received a J.D. from Cornell
Law School in 1996, where she was a Note Editor for the Cornell International Law
Journal. She is currently an associate in the litigation department at Ropes and Gray in
Boston, Massachusetts.
1. R.R. Reid & Peter Behr, A Software Fight's Blurred Battle Lines: U.S. Computer
Companies Are on Both Sides as Japan Considers Copyright Law Changes, WASH. PosT, Jan.
11, 1994, at Dl. See infra text accompanying notes 45-63.
2. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992)
(finding that interim copies for reverse engineering can be a fair use exception to copy-
right infringement); Sega Enter. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc:, 977 F.2d 1510, 1527-28 (9th Cir.
1992) ("[w]here disassembly is the only way to gain access to the ideas and functional
elements embodied in a copyrighted computer program and where there is a legitimate
reason for seeking such access, disassembly is a fair use of the copyrighted work, as a
matter of law"). See infra text accompanying notes 145-71. For an explanation of disas-
sembly, referred to in this Note as reverse engineering or decompilation, see infra Part
I.A.
3. Council Directive 91/250/EEC of 14 May 1991 on the Legal Protection of Com-
puter Programs, art. 6, 1991 Oj. (L 122) 42 [hereinafter Directive]. Commentators have
argued that the Sega and Atari decisions effectively harmonized U.S. and EC law. See
Charles R. McManis, Intellectual Property Protection and Reverse Engineering of Computer
Programs in the United States and the European Community, 8 HIGH TECH. LJ. 25, 48
(1993).
4. Agency for Cultural Affairs Considering Revising Copyright Law to Legalize Reverse
Engineering, JAPIANFsE Gov'T WKLY. DIGrra ItNo., July 23, 1993, available in Westlaw,
Jpgovt Database, 1993 WL 2474454;John Espenshade Titus, Comment, Right to Reverse
Engineer Software: Is Japan Next and Does It Really Matter?, 19 N.C. J. Irr'L L. & COM.
REG. 491, 492 (1994).
5. The Supreme Court has defined reverse engineering as "starting with the known
product and working backward to divine the process which aided in its development or
manufacture." Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470,476 (1974). In Kewanee,
the Court found that trade secret law provides no protection against reverse engineering.
However, the Supreme Court has never considered the permissibility of reverse engineer-
ing in the context of copyright protection for computer software. See infra text accompa-
nying notes 125-30.
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However, despite the apparent unity of international principles, the United
States denounced the Japanese proposal, proclaiming that it was "contrary
to international norms" and would "set a dangerous precedent."6 Suc-
cumbing to U.S. pressure, the Council abandoned its proposal.7
Despite U.S. Commerce Department opposition, the Japanese Coun-
cil's proposal to authorize reverse engineering for the exclusive purpose of
discovering underlying ideas 8 is consistent with emerging trends in inter-
national copyright law.9 Although the U.S. Copyright Act 10 does not spe-
cifically address reverse engineering, two recent appellate court cases held
that decompilation used to extract only the underlying idea is permitted
under the doctrine of fair use.11 Moreover, the European Community has
enacted legislation specifically authorizing reverse engineering for this lim-
ited purpose. 12 Hence, Japan's proposal to authorize decompilation was
not the renegade attempt to circumvent international custom that the
United States portrayed it to be; rather, the proposal was legally defensible
and Japan need not have retreated.
Part I of this Note will explore the factual background underlying
Japan's proposal. It will examine the technical process of decompilation
and analyze Japan's proposal and the international response to it. Part 11
will canvass the spectrum of international law and custom behind the
emerging trend to permit limited decompilation. It will analyze relevant
U.S. and European copyright law within the framework of the Berne Con-
vention, which provides the international basis for copyright law in the
United States, Europe, and Japan.13 Part III will examine the structure of
Japanese copyright law and analyze Japan's recent proposal in light ofJapa-
6. Software Reverse Engineering Under Review in Japan, 6 J. PROPRIETARY RTs. 32
(1994).
7. Japanese Panel Changes Course on Authorizing Reverse Engineering, BNA PATENT,
TR.ADEMARK & COPYRIGHT L. DAILY, June 8, 1994, available in LEXIS, Bna Library, Ptcjnl
File. The Cultural Affairs Agency explained its decision: "We do not see any necessity
to amend the law because there is no [pending legal] dispute among computer compa-
nies on the reverse assembly.... Whether reverse engineering is legal or not will be left
to the courts to decide on specific cases." NIKKEI WK.Y., June 6, 1994, at 8, discussed in
Betsy E. Bayha, Reverse Engineering of Computer Software in the United States, the Euro-
pean Union, and Japan, in ALI-ABA COURSE OF STUDY: ANTITRUST/INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY
CLAIMS IN HIGH TECHNOLOGY MARKETS: LITIGATING AND Ai)VIsING IN AN ERA OF UNCER-
TAINTY 175, 191 (Jan. 26, 1995).
8. The Japanese proposal was limited to revealing ideas behind copyrighted prod-
ucts, and thus did not authorize outright "copycat" reproduction. Japanese Panel
Changes Course on Authorizing Reverse Engineering, supra note 7, at 897.
9. Bayha, supra note 7, at 179.
10. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
11. "Fair use" is a specific provision of the United States Copyright Act. 17 U.S.C.
§ 107 (1988). However, the term is also used more generally to include the doctrine of
fair use. See infra text accompanying notes 119-79.
12. Directive, supra note 3, art. 6.
13. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9,
1886, revised, Paris, July 24, 1971, 25 U.S.T 1341, in UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARK,
COPYRIGHT AND PATENT: SELECTED STATUTES AND INTERNATIONAL AGREEMENTS 331 (Paul
Goldstein et al. eds., 1994) [hereinafter Berne Convention].
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nese law and emerging international trends. Part IV will explore the impli-
cations ofJapan's retreat for the international future of reverse engineering.
I. Background
A. Decompilation
The scope of protection to be given to computer software is one of the most
difficult legal issues in intellectual property. 14 Software is most useful
when it can interact with the software and hardware of other manufactur-
ers, that is, when the software is interoperable. 15 In order to achieve inter-
operability, programs must fit the specifications of other programs, 16 but
specifications are often available only as encoded within the programs
themselves. 17 Consequently, programmers seeking to create software that
is most useful to most computer users must be able to ascertain the specifi-
cations of other programs with which the software will operate by decod-
ing the programs as they are released to the public. 18
1. Forward Engineering
Reverse engineering is best understood as the reversal of the software
development process, sometimes known as forward engineering.' 9 When
developing software, a programmer begins with a goal for the computer; he
decides what he wants the computer to do.20 The goal may be as simple as
averaging a series of numbers or as complex as analyzing the composition
of DNA.21
Next, the programmer conceives of a method for the computer to per-
form the desired goal or task. This conception, the most abstract level of
programming, is referred to as an algorithm.22 Generally an algorithm is
merely an idea in the mind of the programmer, but it may physically exist
in the form of notes or an ouline.23 The programmer then converts the
algorithm into a computer language such as BASIC, Pascal, or FORTRAN-
otherwise known as source code.24 At this stage, the programmer typically
14. McManis, supra note 3, at 26.
15. Interoperable is defined as "capable of being used or operated reciprocally." RAN-
DOM HOUSE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 997 (2d ed. 1987). See Bayha, supra
note 7, at 177; Gary L Ignatin, Let the Hacker's Hack: Allowing the Reverse Engineering of
Copyrighted Computer Programs to Achieve Compatibility, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1999, 2003
(1992).
16. Jaap H. Spoor, Copyright Protection and Reverse Engineering of Software: Imple-
mentation and Effects of the EC Directive, 19 U. DAYTON L. REv. 1063, 1063 (1994).
17. See infra text accompanying notes 36-44.
18. Spoor, supra note 16, at 1079; Ignatin, supra note 15, at 2009.
19. Forward engineering involves several phases of development and translation,
although in actuality they are not as separate or distinguishable as the following descrip-
tion may imply. Titus, supra note 4, at 496-97; James Canfield, Note, The Copyright-
ability of Object Code, 59 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 412, 414 (1984).
20. Canfield, supra note 19, at 413-14.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 413.
23. Titus, supra note 4, at 495.
24. Canfield, supra note 19, at 417.
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inserts comments and instructions to assist later programmers in updating
the source code.25 These commands are intended to explain the intended
logic and organizational structure the programmer had in mind when he
wrote the commands. 26
The microprocessor of a computer does not understand natural lan-
guage or even programming commands as written in computer languages;
the only information a computer registers is the presence or absence of an
electronic impulse, similar to the on-off of a light switch. 27 When there is
an electrical impulse the computer registers a one (1), and when there is no
impulse the computer registers a zero (0).28 Consequently, a computer
program must enter the microprocessor as a stream of ones and zeroes, or
"binary code."29
Because a computer cannot operate a program written in source code,
the source code must be translated from the text of the computer language
into object code, the requisite stream of ones and zeroes. A special pro-
gram, either a compiler or an assembler, is used to accomplish this conver-
sion.30 Thereafter, the computer executes the commands as instructed by
the program until it encounters an instruction indicating that the program
has been completed.31 In summary, the purpose of forward engineering is
to turn the original algorithm or idea into electrical impulses of binary
object code which order the computer to perform specific tasks. 32
2. Reverse Engineering
Reverse engineering, or decompilation, is the inversion of the initial pro-
gramming process just described. It entails reconverting a program from
its binary object code into source code.33 The reverse engineer accom-
plishes this translation by grouping segments of the binary code, con-
ducting the appropriate analysis, and converting the resulting groups of
data into source code.34 Because it would be impossible to perform this
task using only human memory, a computer must copy the original object
code before translation is possible.35
25. For example, comments assist programmers in upgrading WordPerfect 6.0 to
6.1.
26. Andrew Johnson-Laird, Software Reverse Engineering in the Real World, 19 U.
DAYTON L. REv. 843, 857 (1994).
27. Canfield, supra note 19, at 414.
28. Id.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 417.
31. Id.
32. Titus, supra note 4, at 495-96.
33. Id. See also Andrew Pollack, U.S. Protesting Japan's Plan to Revise Software Protec-
tion, N.Y. TIMEs, Nov. 22, 1993, at D2; Software Reverse Engineering Under Review in
Japan, supra note 6, at 32.
34. Titus, supra note 4, at 495; William S. Coats & Heather D. Rafter, The Games
People Play: Sega v. Accolade and the Right to Reverse Engineer Software, 15 HASTINGS
Comm. & Ewr. LJ. 557, 558 (1993).
35. Coats & Rafter, supra note 34, at 559; Pollack, supra note 33; Bayha, supra note
7, at 177. See also MAI Systems Corp. v. Peak Computer, Inc., 991 F.2d 511 (9th Cir.
1993), cert. dismissed, 510 U.S. 1033 (1994) (holding that the loading of a computer
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It is important to note what reverse engineering does not do. The
instructions and comments inserted by the original programmers into the
source code cannot be translated into object code and typically are not
preserved in the marketed programs. 36 As a result, the true secrets of the
organizational structure and inner workings of a program cannot be dis-
covered through traditional reverse engineering methods.3 7 "Reverse engi-
neering is almost entirely an additive process, with the reverse engineer
adding his or her knowledge and experience to meager information con-
tained within the object code."38 Because of the complexity of the process,
reverse engineering often fails.39 In fact, it is often easier and more cost-
efficient for competitors to develop new software than to reverse engineer
existing object code.40
The structure of computer programs presents a unique problem for
copyright law. Traditional copyright law, such as in the United States, pro-
tects expression but not ideas.41 In a computer program, the object code
effectively encrypts both the ideas behind the program and the expression
of those ideas.42 Often the only way to expose the legally exploitable ideas
underlying computer software is to decompile the program.43 Thus, the
legal dilemma presented by reverse engineering is that decompilation
requires making an exact copy of the program-precisely what traditional
copyright law prevents.44
operating system into the random access memory of a computer constitutes the making
of an infringing copy when performed by someone other than the licensee). Subsequent
district court decisions have held that loading a program into RAM constitutes making
an infringing copy. See, e.g., Advanced Computer Serv. of Mich., Inc. v. MAI Sys. Corp.,
845 F. Supp. 356, 362-63 (E.D.Va. 1994); Triad Systems Corp. v. Southeastern Express
Co., 1994 WL 446049 (N.D.Cal. 1994).
36. Johnson-Laird, supra note 26, at 896-97.
37. Id. at 896.
38. Id. at 897.
39., Coats & Rafter, supra note 34, at 559.
40. Spoor, supra note 16, at 1078; Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning
the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. Rnv. 2308, 2341 (1994).
41. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a), (b) (1988). See Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation
Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 547 (1985). See also Pollack, supra note 33.
42. Copyright law is typically based on a distinction between ideas themselves and
the expression of ideas. While the expression of an idea can be copyrighted (e.g.,
CHuA.Es D AWIN, ON THE ORIGIN OF mE SPECIES (1958)), an idea itself cannot (e.g., "sur-
vival of the fittest"); anyone can, as many have, analyze and criticize Darwin's theory.
See infra text accompanying notes 81-85. See also Ignatin, supra note 15, at 2008-09.
43. Sega Enter. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1524 (9th Cir. 1992) ("Com-
puter programs pose unique problems for the application of the 'idea/expression dis-
tinction' that determines the extent of copyright protection.")
44. See. e.g., 17 U.S.C. § 102(a). The U.S. Copyright Act does provide for exemption
from copyright liability if the copy is made for a fair use or for archival purposes. 17
U.S.C. §§ 107, 117 (1988). See infra text accompanying notes 102-24. See also Japanese
Copyright Act, Law No. 48, amended as ofJune 1993 (Law No. 89) at art. 113, reprinted
in Statutory Material: Index Volume DOING BusINrss INJAPA app. 9B (Zentaro Kitagawa
ed., 1996) [hereinafter Japanese Copyright Act].
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B. Japan's Proposal
Japan, whose copyright law is grounded in the idea/expression distinction,
faces the same legal dilemma. Prompted by the apparent authorization of
reverse engineering by two U.S. cases and recently enacted EC legisla-
tion,4 5 Japan began to consider reformulating its own copyright law to per-
mit decompilation. The dispute began when Japan's Ministry of
Education, which oversees copyright issues, formed a committee to analyze
Japanese law on software copying to ensure thatJapan's protection of com-
puter software paralleled that of the United States and Europe.46 In July,
1993, the Japanese Agency of Cultural Affairs formed an advisory commit-
tee, the Council of Researchers for Examination and Research, led by
Zentaro Kitagawa, 4 7 to review software copyright law and develop sugges-
tions for future legislation. Contrary to its earlier proposals to increase
restrictions on the use of computer software,48 the Council announced the
possibility of allowing software users to decompile computer programs. 49
The Council favored allowing reverse engineering for the limited purpose
of extracting "ideas" behind products, but not for making "copycat
products."s0
A number of factors contributed to the timing of Japan's proposal.
First, Japan has recently experienced an economic recession.5 1 Japan has
dealt with economic downturns in the past by increasing exports.52
Because of the increasing global demand for software products and Japan's
relatively insignificant supply of such products, legalization of reverse engi-
neering could provide Japanese programmers with the information they
need to compete in the global software market.' 3 Second, Japan's proposal
was in response to an apparent international trend to legalize reverse engi-
neering in a limited context. After the passage of the Directive 54 in the
European Community and the decisions of two U.S. appellate courts in
Sega Enterprises Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc."5 and Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo
45. See Directive, supra note 3.
46. Reid & Behr, supra note 1.
47. Japanese Panel Changes Course on Authorizing Reverse Engineering, supra note 7.
The Keidanren (the Federation of Economic Organizations of Japan) considered similar
proposals. Negotiators Make No Progress in Intellectual Property Talks, INT'L TRAIDE REP.
Jan. 5, 1994, at 10, available in LEXIS, Intlaw Library, Intrad File.
48. Japan Government Weighs Restrictions on Software Copying by Individuals, INT'L
TRADE RE'., July 7, 1993, at 1128, available in LEXIS, Indaw Library, Intrad File.
49. Software Reverse Engineering Under Review in Japan, supra note 6, at 32.
50. Japanese Panel Changes Course on Authorizing Reverse Engineering, supra note 7.
See also Negotiators Make No Progress in Intellectual Property Talks, supra note 47.
51. Labour Pains, ECONOMYsT, Feb. 12, 1994, at 74, available in LEXIS, News Library,
Txmws File.
52. Special Report Trade Negotiators Turn Eastward, INT'L TRADE REP.,Jan. 19, 1994, at
102, available in LEXIS, Inflaw Library, Intrad File.
53. Japan's best computer software, Ichitaro, was written more than ten years ago.
Japan to Draft Guidelines on Computer Software Copyrights, INT'L TRADE REP., Feb. 10,
1993, available in LEXIS, Indaw Library, Intrad File.
54. Directive, supra note 3.
55. 977 F.2d at 1510.
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of America, Inc.,5 6 it seemed clear that reverse engineering, at least in the
limited context articulated in both the Directive and the American cases,
was legal.5 7
Japan's proposal threatened to affect directly U.S. and international
trade. The United States accounts for seventy-eight percent of worldwide
software sales. 5 8 Of the 140 million personal computers in the world,
ninety percent use either Microsofts DOS or Windows operating sys-
tems.5 9 Despite the significance of the proposal, both the U.S. government
and industry were slow to respond.60 The United States made no response
until November, when Secretary of Commerce Ron Brown and U.S. Trade
Representative Mickey Kantor wrote a letter to Japanese Trade Minister
Hiroshi Kumagaii complaining that the proposal was contrary to the spirit
of trade negotiations between the two countries held in July.6 1 U.S.
Ambassador to Japan Walter Mondale personally called Education Minister
Ryoko Akamatsu to say that "the U.S. is strongly opposed to any weakening
in Japan's copyright law."62 Assistant Commissioner for External Affairs at
the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office, Michael K. Kirk, argued that the new
proposal would be contrary to "international norms" and would "set a dan-
gerous precedent."63
In response to these concerns, the Japanese Cultural Affairs Agency
held a hearing on the issue, at which several members of the U.S. Patent
and Trademark Office testified.6 4 Although several representatives of U.S.
industry spoke, opinion on the legalization of reverse engineering was
split.6 5 On June 7, 1994, an official of the Japanese Cultural Affairs
Agency announced that the panel agreed that Japan should not legalize
reverse engineering of computer software.6 6 The official cited U.S. pres-
sures as the reason for the shift in direction, and admitted that the panel
had withdrawn the proposal.6 7
56. 975 F.2d at 832.
57. Titus, supra note 4, at 510.
58. Negotiators Make No Progress in Intellectual Property Talks, supra note 47, at 10.
59. USA- Reinventiong Microsoft: Mark II, ECONOas-r, Mar. 19, 1994, at 81, available
in LEXIS, World Library, Txtlne File.
60. Reid & Behr, supra note 1. IBM first found out about the proposal through a
Japanese industry association and alerted the U.S. government. Id.
61. Titus, supra note 4, at 493-94. This hearing occurred in the context of "eco-
nomic framework talks" between the United States andJapan, which were generally suc-
cessful. The talks on intellectual property and the U.S.-Japanese Economic Summit,
which followed in February, 1994, however, were failures. Id. at 494-95.
62. Reid & Behr, supra note 1.
63. Software Reverse Engineering Under Review in Japan, supra note 6, at 32.
64. Japanese Software Update, J. PRoPPiETARY RTS., Feb. 1994, at 31.
65. Titus, supra note 4, at 494. "At a time when we are engaged in a process to
provide greater access for U.S. and other foreign goods and services to the Japanese
market, it is a matter of grave concern to learn of this activity that has the potential of
having just the opposite effect." Pollack, supra note 33.
66. Japanese Panel Changes Course on Authorizing Reverse Engineering, supra note 7.
67. Id. This was not the first time Japan had foregone a plan to loosen software
protection. A similar strategy was abandoned as a result of pressure from the United
States and some segments of the Japanese software industry. Pollack, supra note 33;
Software Reverse Engineering Under Review in Japan, supra note 6, at 32.
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II. International Law
Although Japan surrendered to U.S. charges that its proposal to permit
decompilation violated existing international norms, an examination of rel-
evant international law reveals that Japan need not have been so quick to
retreat. The Berne Convention, which provides the backdrop to copyright
law for the United States, the European Community, and Japan, leaves the
door open for decompilation.6 8 Moreover, recent U.S. case law and EC
legislation have taken the position that limited decompilation is permissi-
ble.69 Thus, Japan's proposal was consistent with emerging trends in inter-
national law.
A. The Berne Convention
The Berne Convention,70 first enacted in 1886, offers the broadest basis for
international copyright protection.7 ' Its general purpose is to protect the
rights of authors of literary and artistic works.72 However, such works are
not protected by the Convention itself, but rather by legislation in the
country of original publication. 73 Signatories may create separate agree-
ments among themselves if those agreements meet minimum standards
established by the Convention.74
The three guiding principles of the Berne Convention are national
treatment, automatic protection, and independent protection. First, indi-
viduals are accorded national treatment in that both citizens and non-citi-
zens qualify for identical treatment.75 Second, protection is automatic
rather than dependent upon observation of formalities. 76 Finally, a base
level of protections is available in all member countries.77
While the Berne Convention creates a number of specific rights for the
68. See infra Part II.A.
69. See Directive, supra note 3.
70. Berne Convention, supra note 13.
71. Anne Moebes, Negotiating International Copyright Protection: The United States
and European Community Positions, 14 Loy. L.A. INT'L & CoMp. LJ. 301,305 (1992). The
United States, Japan, and all Member States of the European Community are signatories
of the Berne Convention.
72. Berne Convention, supra note 13, art. 1.
73. Id. art. 5(4)(a).
74. Moebes, supra note 71, at 303. For example, the United States is a party to the
North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, US.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 605
(1993) [hereinafter NAFTA]. NAFTA not only meets all the requirements of the Berne
Convention, but also goes further by providing additional enforcement mechanisms. See
Michelle Bodine-Keely, Comment, Software Protection in the NAFTA and Berne Regimes:
A Comparative Analysis of U.S. and Canadian Copyright Law, 1 TULSAJ. COMP. & INT'L L.
375, 377 (1994). Although NAFTA explicitly deals with many aspects of copyright pro-
tection for computer software, it leaves the issue of reverse engineering to applicable
national law. Id. at 383.
75. Berne Convention, supra note 13, art. 5(1).
76. Id. art. 5(2) ("The enjoyment and exercise of these rights shall not be subject to
any formality."). Examples of such formalities are: the deposit of a copy of a work,
registration with some official body, or payment of registration fees. WoRLD INTELLEC-
TUAL PROPERTY ORGANIZATION, GUIDE TO THE BERNE CONVENTION FOR THE PROTECTION OF
LITERARY AND ARTIsTIc WoRKs (PARis ACT, 1971), at 33 (1978).
77. Berne Convention, supra note 13, art. 2.
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author of a creative or artistic work,78 it does not explicitly address the
issue of reverse engineering. Although computer programs are not specifi-
cally listed in the Berne Convention, they are clearly protected as literary
works.79 The Convention does contain a limited fair-use provision, but it
has not been interpreted so broadly as to permit decompilation.80
B. United States Law
1. Foundations of Copyright Law
The constitutional language that is the source of U.S. copyright law sheds
light on the law's fundamental purposes and indicates the limited nature of
a copyright holder's rights.81 While the immediate purpose of copyright
law is to protect the exclusive rights of the creator, its concomitant goal is
to benefit society as a whole by encouraging production.82 Thus, there is a
dual nature to a copyrighted work its expression is privately owned while
its underlying ideas and certain derivative uses are simultaneously open to
the public. This inherent limitation on any copyrighted work is a result of
the special nature of precisely what is owned.83 The creative process-
knowledge itself-depends on access to prior thought.84 Therefore, unlike
a privately owned plot of land or a bicycle, from which an owner can
78. The Berne Convention protects unpublished as well as published works, id. art.
4(2), and grants authors the exclusive right to make and authorize translations of their
work. Id. art. 8. The Convention further grants authors exclusive control over the repro-
duction of their works with the narrow exception of certain reproductions by the press.
Id. art. 9. Authors also retain control over any adaptations, arrangements, and other
alterations of the work. Id. art. 12.
79. Marc A. Ehrlich, Comment, Fair Use or Foul Play? The EC Directive on the Legal
Protection of Computer Programs and Its Impact on Reverse Engineering, 13 PACE L. REv.
1003, 1020 (1994). The computer industry was in its infancy when the Berne Conven-
tion was last amended in 1971. Id.
80. Berne Convention, supra note 13, art. 10. That the Berne Convention contains a
fair-use provision is of great significance given the fact that fair use is the theory U.S.
courts have used to authorize reverse engineering. See infra text accompanying notes
119-79. The fair-use provision of the Berne Convention provides:
(2) It shall be a matter for legislation in the countries of the Union, and for
special agreements existing or to be concluded between them, to permit the utili-
zation, to the extent justified by the purpose, of literary or artistic works by way
of illustration in publications, broadcasts or sound or visual recordings for
teaching, provided such utilization is compatible with fair practice.
Berne Convention, supra note 13, art. 10.
81. "The Congress shall have the Power... to promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to
their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CoNsr. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
82. The grant of copyright "is intended to motivate the creative activity of authors
and inventors by the provision of a special reward.... The monopoly created by copy-
right thus rewards the individual author in order to benefit the public." Harper & Row,
Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 546 (1985), quoting Sony Corp. of
America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984)). "The immediate
effect of our copyright law is to secure a fair return for an author's creative labor. But
the ultimate aim is, by this incentive, to stimulate artistic creativity for the general public
good." Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975).
83. Thus, it is not as if a right is being taken away. Rather, the copyright owner
never possessed the right to exclude the ideas from the public domain.
84. As Judge Kozinski noted,
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exclude others for any reason or no reason at all, public access to copy-
righted property is often permitted.85
2. Statutory Protection
The Copyright Act addresses this dual concern for public and private inter-
ests by distinguishing between ideas and expressions: it explicitly protects
only the expression of ideas, and not ideas themselves.8 6 Were it other-
wise, the first individual to write about an idea would have the last word on
the subject; future discussion of the idea would be a copyright violation.87
Because copyright protection is limited to expression, however, subsequent
authors are free to use ideas or general concepts from a previous work. In
addition, where an idea and its expression are "inseparable," the expres-
sion encompassing the idea is not protected by the Copyright Act.88
Although not specifically mentioned in the text of the Copyright Act,
computer programs are dearly included within the scope of protection.8 9
Section 102 of the .Copyright Act protects "original works of authorship
fixed in any tangible medium of expression, now known or later devel-
Overprotecting intellectual property is as harmful as underprotecting it. Creativ-
ity.is impossible without a rich public domain. Nothing today, likely nothing
since we tamed fire, is genuinely new. Culture, like science and technology,
grows by accretion, each new creator building on the works of those who came
before. Overprotection stifles the very creative process it's supposed to nurture.
White v. Samsung Elec. America, Inc., 989 F.2d 1512, 1513 (9th Cir. 1993) (Kozinski,J.,
dissenting).
85. See, e.g., 17 U.S.C. §§ 107, 117 (1988).
86. 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988). This conception first emerged in Baker v. Selden,
101 U.S. 99, 103, (1879). See also Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471
U.S. 539, 547 (1985).
87. Thus, John Grisham can copyright The Firm, but not the concept of legal fiction;
any of us is free to try her hand at it. Wayne A. Ely, Note, Copyright and Trademark
Protection of Computer Software-Reverse Engineering of Competitor's Computer Game
Software, Required to Comprehend Work, and Resulting in Display of "False Trademark,"
Not Violative of Copyright Act or Lanham Act-Sega Enterprises, Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 12
Tmam. EivrL. L. & TECH. J. 137, 148 (1993). See also supra note 42.
88. Ely, supra note 87 at 148. Idea is broadly defined in 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) to
include "any idea, procedure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle,
or discovery, regardless of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or
embodied." The Supreme Court has observed that
[tihe primary objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but
"[tlo promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts." Art. I, § 8, cl. 8. To this
end, copyright assures authors the right to their original expression, but encour-
ages others to build freely upon the ideas and information conveyed by a work.
This principle, known as the idea/expression or fact/expression dichotomy,
applies to all works of authorship.... This result is neither unfair nor unfortu-
nate. It is the means by which copyright advances the progress of science and
art.
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 349-50 (1991) (cita-
tions omitted).
89. Peter A. Wald et al., Standards for Interoperability and the Copyright Protection of
Computer Programs, in PRAc-icmNG LAw INsrrrtrr, PATENTs, COPYRIGHTS, TRADEmARxs,
AND LrrEEARY PROPERTY COURSE HANDBOOK SERIES, PLI Order No. G4-3920 (1994), avail-
able in Westlaw, 390 PLI/Pat. 481, 499.
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oped,"90 and specifies that "works of authorship" include "literary
works."91  Rather than creating a sui generis form of protection, 92 the
courts have analyzed computer programs under the rubric of copyright law
by recognizing computer programs in either source or object code as liter-
ary works.93
Legislative history makes it clear that Congress intended the idea/
expression dichotomy to apply to computer programs.94 Specifically, the
Computer Software Copyright Act,95 an amendment to the Copyright
Act 96 based on the recommendation of the National Commission on New
Technological Uses of Copyrighted Works (CONTU), 97 defines a computer
90. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a) (1988). Thus, the Act imposes an originality requirement
that the work be the author's own intellectual creation. See Becki Fahle, Comment, The
Effect of the Directive on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs on Copyright Law in the
EC, 14 Hous. J. IN'L L. 659, 676 (1992) (discussing the idea/expression dichotomy
within the context of the EC Directive).
91. 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)(1) (1988).
92. Sui generis is defined as being "of its own kind or class." B.cI's L.AW DicnoN-
ARY 1434 (6th ed. 1990). Congress could have created an independent source of protec-
tion for computer programs, sui generis, but instead chose to protect software within the
existing copyright framework
93. Apple Computer, Inc. v. Formula Int'l Inc., 725 F.2d 521, 525 (9th Cir. 1984)
(section 102 applies to computer programs and protects ideas but not expressions);
Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240, 1248 (3d Cir. 1983),
cert. dismissed, 464 U.S. 1033 (1984) (both source and object code protected); Stem
Elec., Inc. v. Kaufman, 669 F.2d 852 (2d Cir. 1982) (source code protected); Williams
Elec., Inc. v. Arctic Int'l, Inc., 685 F.2d 870 (3d Cir. 1982) (object code protected). The
1976 House Report states that the definition of "literary works .... includes computer
data bases and computer programs to the extent that they incorporate authorship in the
programmer's expression of original ideas as distinguished from the ideas themselves."
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 54 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5667.
94. Legislative history reveals that
[s]ome concern has been expressed lest copyright in computer programs should
extend protection to methodology or processes adopted by the programmer,
rather than merely to the 'writing' expressing his ideas. Section 102(b) is
intended, among other things, to make clear that the expression adopted by the
programmer is the copyrightable element in a computer programmer, and that
the actual process or methods embodied in the program are not within the
scope of the copyright law.
H.R. REP. No. 94-1476, at 26 (1976), reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659. See also
United States Copyright Office, Copyright Registration for Computer Programs, Circu-
lar 61 (1987) ("copyright protection is not available for ideas, program logic, algorithms,
systems, methods, concepts, or layouts"). While Congress did intend to grant computer
software copyright owners exclusive rights to their works under 17 U.S.C. § 106(1)
(1988), it chose to postpone enacting specific copyright legislation for computer
software in 1976.
95. 17 U.S.C. §§ 101, 107 (1988).
96. The Act was so amended on December 12, 1980. Pub. L. No. 96-517, § 10(a), 94
Stat. 3015, 3028 (1980).
97. H.R. REP. No. 96-1307, at 23 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6460, 6482.
Congress created CONTU in 1976 to study computers and other technological advance-
ments and to advise Congress whether these technologies should be integrated into the
existing copyright scheme. CONTU has been the subject of much criticism from those
who would like to see a separate legal structure for computer issues. The central fear of
those who seek reformation is overprotection. Arthur R. Miller, Copyright Protection for
Computer Programs, Databases, and Computer-Generated Works: Is Anything New Since
CONTU?, 106 HIv. L. REv. 978, 978 (1993).
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program as "a set of statements or instructions to be used directly or indi-
rectly in a computer in order to bring about a certain result."98 When
viewed in combination with section 102(a), 99 this language clearly illus-
trates that even a program in object code is subject to copyright protec-
tion. °00 However, the ideas embodied in a computer program are not
protected for the same reasons ideas in any other work are not
protected.10'
The process of decompilation necessarily entails a number of copy-
right violations. First, the software engineer will make at least one copy of
the object code in the computer's memory, which is then translated into
source code.10 2 In addition, the final source code will be an unauthorized
derivative of the original object code, so that recording the results in any
way, even manually on paper, constitutes the production of further unau-
thorized copies.' 0 3 Given that multiple copyright violations may occur,
the only way decompilation would be permissible is if an affirmative
defense excused the violations. The Copyright Act provides two potential
affirmative defenses: archival copy 104 and fair use.10 5
a. Archival Copy
Section 117 of the Copyright Act allows software owners to make backup
copies of legitimately purchased computer programs. It provides:
Notwithstanding the provisions of section 106, it is not an infringement for
the owner of a copy of a computer program to make or authorize the making
of another copy or adaptation of that computer program provided:(1) that such a new copy or adaptation is created as an essential step in
the utilization of the computer program in conjunction with a
machine and that it is used in no other manner, or(2) that such new copy or adaptation is for archival purposes only and
that all archival copies are destroyed in the event that continued pos-
session of the computer program should cease to be rightful. 10 6
Although Congress did contemplate extending this statute to cover
decompilation, the silent legislative history has been interpreted to imply
that Congress did not intend for reverse engineering to be lawful per se.107
98. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
99. The Act protects works that can be "perceived, reproduced, or otherwise commu-
nicated, either directly or with the aid of a machine or device." 17 U.S.C. § 102(a)
(1988).
100. See H.R. 94-1476, at 54 (1976) reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5659, 5667. See,
e.g., Johnson Controls, Inc. v. Phoenix Control Sys., Inc., 886 F.2d 1173, 1175 (9th Cir.
1989).
101. See, e.g., Apple Computer, Inc. v. Franklin Computer Corp., 714 F.2d 1240,
1252-53 (3d Cir. 1983).
102. Ignatin, supra note 15, at 2011.
103. Id. at 2011-12.
104. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1988).
105. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
106. 17 U.S.C. § 117 (1988).
107. See Joe L. Gage, Jr., Comment, Copyright Law and Reverse Engineering: Have
Recent Decisions Taken the Fair Out of Use?, 46 BAYLOR L. REv. 183, 187 (1994).
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In Vault Corp. v. Quaid Software Ltd.,' 08 the Fifth Circuit interpreted sec-
tion 117 to include the copying used in decompilation as "an essential step
in the utilization of the computer program."10 9 The court construed sec-
tion 117(2) to authorize a program owner to copy it "for any reason so long
as the owner uses the copy for archival purposes only and not for an unau-
thorized transfer." 110 In holding that copying for decompilation was an
"archival purpose" which was "necessary to the utilization of the pro-
gram,""' the Fifth Circuit has been the only U.S. court to extend section
117 to protect reverse engineering.
In Sega, the Ninth Circuit explicitly rejected the use of section 117 to
authorize decompilation, 112 holding instead that Accolade's use was
beyond the intended scope of section 117.113 Although the Copyright Act
does not define archival purpose,114 Black's Law Dictionary defines archives
as "place[s] where old books, manuscripts, records, etc. are kept."115
Thus, the plain meaning of archival implies retaining information in a pas-
sive sense. Copying for purposes of decompilation is outside the scope of
the Act. 116 Allowing copying for decompilation purposes effectively reads
section 117(2) out of the Copyright Act by rendering meaningless the
requirement that a copy be for "archival purposes only." A careful analysis
of the Fifth Circuit's opinion in Vault Corp. supports this interpretation. In
that case, Quaid decompiled Vault Corp.'s copy-protected program to over-
ride the copy protection1 7 -clearly not an archival purpose. 1 18
The archival-purpose provision of the Copyright Act thus offers no
support for the legalization of decompilation. As a result, courts turned to
the only other statutory provision which could encompass reverse engi-
neering-section 107's fair-use provision.
b. Fair Use
Because the purpose of copyright law is not only to reward the author of a
work, but also to encourage the exploration of ideas,1 19 the Copyright Act
establishes a limited privilege for individuals to use copyrighted work in a
reasonable manner without the permission of the copyright owner.1 20
Thus, fair use is an affirmative defense to an allegation of copyright
infringement. 12 1 It "serves as a means of balancing the public's interest in
108. 847 F.2d 255, 261 (5th Cir. 1988).
109. Id. at 266.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. Sega Enter. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1518 (9th Cir. 1992).
113. Id. at 1520.
114. See 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988).
115. BLAC's LAW DICTIONARY 106 (6th ed. 1990).
116. See McManis, supra note 3, at 85.
117. Vault Corp., 847 F.2d at 255, 257.
118. See Gage, supra note 107, at 187.
119. See supra text accompanying notes 81-85.
120. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
121. Ely, supra note 87, at 149.
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exchange against the copyright holder's rights in his or her work." 122 Sec-
tion 107 provides that four factors determine whether the use made in a
particular case is fair:
(1) The purpose and character of the use, including whether such use is of a
commercial nature or is for non-profit educational purposes;
(2) the nature of the copyrighted work;
(3) the amount and substantiality of the portion used in relation to the
copyrighted work as a whole; and
(4) the effect of the use upon the potential market for or value of the copy-
righted work.1 23
A traditional analysis of these factors would condemn reverse engi-
neering to the realm of illegal infringement. First, competitive, commercial
gain is the purpose and character of the use. Second, the nature of the
work is the creative product of a programmer who seeks monetary reward
for his efforts. Since decompilation necessarily involves an absolute copy
of the original program, the third factor, the "amount and substantiality of
the portion used," clearly cuts against a finding of fair use. Finally,
allowing absolute copying of a program could destroy the author's poten-
tial market and thus decrease the incentive to produce. 124 Consequently, if
fair use were to present an affirmative defense for reverse engineering, the
inherent nature of computer software would compel courts to expand the
traditional application of the four-factor test.
3. Case Law
The Supreme Court has never addressed the issue of reverse engineer-
ing. 125 Consequently, U.S. appellate court decisions currently provide the
only guidance on the prospect of fair use as an affirmative defense in com-
puter software reverse engineering. The Supreme Court has never been
inclined to hear cases on technical issues, and decompilation of computer
software is a complex area of technology. 126 Perhaps more importantly,
because losing a copyright infringement case often means losing the right
to produce a line of products, litigants are generally unwilling to take a
case to the Supreme Court.127 If the Court were to issue an injunction, a
product line or even an entire corporation could be destroyed. 128 Further-
more, the current players in the computer software industry have little
desire to resolve the issue definitively.129 Companies often simultaneously
decompile the programs of others and seek injunctions to prevent the
decompilation of their own works. 130
122. Id.
123. 17 U.S.C. § 107 (1988).
124. Gage, supra note 107, at 191.
125. See supra note 5.
126. See supra Part I.A.
127. Gage, supra note 107, at 184-85.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id.
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a. The Unique Nature of Computer Software
Computers pose a unique problem for copyright law.131 First, when a
computer program exists in object code, the function, or idea, of the pro-
gram is effectively hidden in a tremendous amount of incomprehensible
expression. Second, any use of a computer program requires making a
copy of the program in the memory of the computer. As such, a broad
interpretation of "reproduction" effectively precludes discovery of the ideas
underlying a computer program.132
Although copyright protection extends to expression only and not to
ideas, where an idea and its expression are "inseparable," the expression
encompassing the idea is not protected by the Copyright Act.133 There-
fore, emphasis on the idea/expression dichotomy has resulted in reduced
protection for computer software.134 When expression of the underlying
idea effectively encrypts the idea, protection of the expression necessarily
restricts access to the idea.135 In this sense, ideas are inadvertently pro-
tected. Thus, if the only way to expose ideas is to copy the expression,
courts are faced with a choice: either they can provide a defense to illegal
copying, or they can extend copyright protection to ideas de facto.
Unlike a novel or a musical composition, the expression in computer
software does not reveal the underlying idea. Assume, for example, that we
have no idea how to average numbers. Someone programs a computer to
perform this task. The program asks us to enter numbers, and when we
have finished, it calculates the average. The programmer who created this
software can copyright the program itself-the expression. Yet, he cannot
copyright the underlying idea, or algorithm, that to average numbers one
must add all of the numbers together and divide the sum by the total
number of figures added together. Since computer software is comprehen-
sible to a computer only when it is incomprehensible to a human, ideas are
effectively protected in the process of protecting the expression. 136
When a court seeks to determine whether there has been a copyright
infringement,137 it examines only the expression of the copyrighted work-
not the idea. Courts look at the purpose and character of the use of the
expression, the nature of the expression, the amount of the expression
used, and the effect of the use of the expression. In contrast, ideas may be
taken and used wholesale. Whether the ultimate use of the product of
reverse engineering is fair is an analytically distinct issue from the fairness
131. Wald, supra note 89, at 487.
132. Id. See also Spoor, supra note 16, at 1077.
133. Ely, supra note 87, at 148.
134. Titus, supra note 4, at 499.
135. Ignatin, supra note 15, at 2015; see Bayha, supra note 7, at 192.
136. I choose this example because it is one everyone can understand. Do not, how-
ever, be misled by the fact that one could learn the idea of averaging numbers from
many other sources. Suppose, for example, that the first expression of Einstein's theory
of relativity had been in the form of a computer program. Unless decompilation were
authorized, the idea would be effectively encrypted with the expression.
137. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988).
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of the process of reverse engineering. 138
The inescapable fusion of ideas and expression in a computer pro-
gram results in either underinclusive or overinclusive copyright protection.
Reverse engineering is either actionable in all instances, in which case
ideas would necessarily be wrongly protected, or the expression is inade-
quately protected in order to expose the ideas. As the issue is complex,
policy considerations cut both ways. An individual who develops an inter-
operable, or compatible, product is not exposed to the initial market risks
borne by the original innovator. She has greater assurance of a successful
product before production.139 Moreover, a clone developer does not have
to compensate the innovator for the value of the successful market.' 40
Clearly contrary to the "dissemination of ideas" purpose of the Copyright
Act, this "free rider" situation may discourage creative individuals from
entering the market. 141 On the other hand, the competition resulting from
the opportunity to clone products requires the original inventor to continue
to improve. 142 As in other areas of the economy, increased competition
reduces prices and increases accessibility for consumers.143 Capitalism
plays a strong role in policy preferences. 144
b. Expansion of the Four-Factors Test
As discussed above, a traditional fair-use analysis probably would not per-
mit decompilation. However, the unique nature of computer software has
persuaded some courts to expand the traditional reading to compensate for
the impracticality of discovering the ideas underlying a program. Conse-
quently, courts have expanded the application of the four-factors test even
beyond computer software.
i) Atari v. Nintendo
The idea that copying is a fair use if it is necessary to reveal the underlying
ideas was first expressed by the Federal Circuit in Atari v. Nintendo.145
The Nintendo Entertainment System is designed to operate only with
Nintendo game cartridges. The system is equipped with a program that
138. McManis, supra note 3, at 73. See also Hoehling v. Universal City Studios, Inc.,
618 F.2d 972, 980 (2d Cir. 1980) (one "may make significant use of prior work, so long
as he does not bodily appropriate the expression of another").
139. John T. Soma et al., Software Interoperability and Reverse Engineering, 20 RUTGERS
CoMPuTER & TECH. I.J. 189, 200 (1994).
140. Id.
141. Id.
142. Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc., 489 U.S. 141, 160 (1989) ("the
competitive reality of reverse engineering may act as a spur to the inventor, creating an
incentive to develop inventions that meet the rigorous requirements of patentability.").
143. Soma, supra note 139, at 201.
144. Wald, supra note 89, at 512 ("Our society favors free commerce in compatible
products"). This sentiment is reflected in recent caselaw emphasizing the importance of
defining protectable elements of a work to avoid excluding competitors from lines of
commerce. See, e.g., Cooling Sys. and Flexibles, Inc., v. Stuart Radiator, Inc., 777 F.2d
485, 492 (9th Cir. 1985).
145. Atari Games Corp. v. Nintendo of America, Inc., 975 F.2d 832 (Fed. Cir. 1992).
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locks access to the operating system. Thus, a game cartridge will not oper-
ate unless it contains a program which unlocks the system. Every
Nintendo game cartridge is designed with a key chip which unlocks this
"10NES lock" program. In hopes of entering the game cartridge market,
Atari decompiled the "key" program and used it to create a program to
successfully unlock the 1ONES lock program.
146
Since Atari was unable to translate the object code it copied from the
Nintendo program into readable source code, it fraudulently obtained a
copy of the program from the Copyright Office under the guise of prepar-
ing for litigation. The Atari court analyzed the four factors of fair use, and
found that "[r]everse engineering, untainted by the purloined copy of the
lONES program and necessary to understand 10NES, is a fair use."147
Because in this case Atari had obtained the original copy fraudulently,
the Court's analysis of reverse engineering is dicta. Nevertheless, the
court's analysis is persuasive. When analyzing the second factor, the
"nature of the copyrighted work," the court announced that a work's
nature supports fair use when it "requires intermediate copying to under-
stand the ideas and processes." 148 Although the Atari court cited no
authority for the seemingly new proposition, the principle is clearly consis-
tent with the idea/expression dichotomy at the basis of copyright
protection.14 9
ii) Sega v. Accolade
The Ninth Circuit adopted Atari's dicta as its holding in Sega v. Acco-
lade.'5 0 In Sega, Accolade purchased a Genesis console and three Sega
game cartridges and wired an electronic decompiler into the console.'
5
'
Accolade developed a manual which contained the functional descriptions
of the interface requirements, but did not contain the actual source code
found in the Sega program.' 5 2 Accolade developers then used this manual
to develop game cartridges compatible with the Sega Genesis console.'5
3
To reach its conclusion that decompilation may be a fair use where
there is no other way to unravel the ideas behind the program, the court
analyzed each of the fair use factors. First, the court discussed the "pur-
pose and character of a use, including whether or not such use is of a
commercial nature or is for nonprofit educational purposes."' 5 4 Since the
copy was made for commercial purposes, the first factor presumptively
favored Sega. However, the court noted that "the commercial nature of a
146. Id. at 836.
147. Id. at 844.
148. Id.
149. See supra text accompanying notes 81-101.
150. Sega Enter. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1527-28 (9th Cir. 1992).
151. Id. at 1514-15.
152. Id. at 1515.
153. Id.
154. 17 U.S.C. § 107(1) (1988).
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use is a matter of degree, not an absolute."155 Although the ultimate pur-
pose of copying was commercial, the immediate purpose of copying was to
study Sega's program.15 6 In fact, the court implicitly concluded that creat-
ing compatible products was a legitimate and "non-exploitative" pur-
pose.157 The court further observed that the public benefit resulting from
a commercial use may be considered.158 "[Gliven the purpose and charac-
ter of Accolade's use of Sega's video game programs," the court concluded,
"the presumption of unfairness has been overcome and the first statutory
factor weighs in favor of Accolade." 15 9
The second factor is the "nature of the copyrighted work."' 60 The
court recognized that because copyright law protects ideas, but not expres-
sions, computer programs pose unique problems for the application of
traditional copyright rules.161 A computer program is a useful article, one
having "an intrinsic utilitarian function that is not merely to portray the
appearance of the article or to convey information." 162 While a computer
program is expressive, it is a purely "useful article" because it comprises
the steps a computer uses to complete a task. 63 Since computer programs
contain unprotected ideas that could not be examined without copying, the
Ninth Circuit found that the second factor also weighed in Accolade's
favor..
The third statutory factor, "the amount and substantiality of the por-
tion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole,"164 clearly
weighed in Sega's favor. As is necessary for reverse engineering, Accolade
copied the program in its entirety. 165 Due to the limited use of the copies,
however, the court assigned the third factor little weight. 166 Furthermore,
the Court found that copying the entire work does not preclude a fair-use
defense, especially where the "ultimate (as opposed to direct) use is as lim-
ited as it was here."' 67
155. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1522 (quoting Maxtone-Graham v. Burtchaell, 803 F.2d 1253,
1262 (2d Cir. 1986)).
156. Coats & Rafter, supra note 34, at 566.
157. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1523.
158. Id. The Court concluded that the commercial use was indirect and that the pub-
lic benefitted from the dissemination of new creative works.
159. Id.
160. 17 U.S.C. § 107(2) (1988).
161. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1524.
162. 17 U.S.C. § 101 (1988). See Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99, 102-04 (1879) (recog-
nizing that works having a strong functional element, such as accounting textbooks, are
not entitled to the same degree of protection as non-functional works). See also
McManis, supra note 3, at 69.
163. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1524-25 ("Computer programs are, in essence, utilitarian arti-
cles-articles that accomplish tasks. As such, they contain many logical, structural, and
visual display elements that are dictated by the function to be performed, by considera-
tions of efficiency, or by external factors such as compatibility requirements and indus-
try demands.").
164. 17 U.S.C. § 107(3) (1988).
165. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1526.
166. Id. at 1526-27.
167. Id.
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Finally, the court considered "the effect of the use upon the potential
market for or value of the copyrighted work " 16 8 In contrast to the defend-
ant who directly usurped the market in Harper & Row,' 6 9 Accolade used
the copy to create an original product and become a legitimate competitor.
Moreover, Accolade did not directly commercially exploit any of the pro-
tected elements. The Sega court elevated the "ultimate" use of developing
compatible programs over the "direct" use of copying Sega's code.' 70
When viewed through the lens of the purpose of promoting creative expres-
sion, the fourth factor favored Accolade. 17 1
iii) Campbell v. Acuff-Rose
The Ninth Circuit's approach in Sega was implicitly approved by the
Supreme Court in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose. 172 The Supreme Court has con-
tinued the expansion of the four-factors test outside the context of decom-
pilation and computer software. In its most recent treatment of fair use,
the Court employed a very expansive reading of the four factors to find that
fair use presented a valid affirmative defense to commercial parody.
In 1964, Roy Orbison and William Dees wrote a rock ballad entitled
"Oh, Pretty Woman" and assigned their rights in it to Acuff-Rose, which
registered the song for copyright protection.173 2 Live Crew, a rap group,
wrote a song in 1989 entitled "Pretty Woman" which Campbell, the writer,
described as intended "through comical lyrics, to satirize the original
work"'17 4 One year after the song's release, Acuff-Rose sued 2 Live Crew
for copyright infringement. 175 In a long-awaited Supreme Court decision
on parody, the Court announced that commercial use is not presumptively
unfair and does not presumptively harm the relevant market, and declared
that parody is entitled to fair-use analysis under the section 107 factors as
criticism.176
The Campbell decision significantly altered the way the Supreme Court
approached fair use. First, the Court explicitly put to rest the presumption
originally articulated in Sony that commercial use is unfair.1 77 Second, the
Court limited the Sony presumption of market harm in commercial cases to
168. 17 U.S.C. § 107(4) (1988).
169. Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 562 (1985).
170. Sega, 977 F.2d at 1526-27.
171. "By facilitating the entry of a new competitor, the first lawful one that is not a
Sega licensee, Accolade's disassembly of Sega's software undoubtedly 'affected' the mar-
ket," Id. at 1523, but it did so positively, leading to "an increase in the number of inde-
pendently designed video game programs offered for use with the Genesis console." Id.
Sega's attempt to exclude competitors was indirectly characterized as an effort "to
monopolize the market by making it impossible for others to compete." Id. at 1523-24.
See also Soma, supra note 139, at 219.
172. Campbell v. Acuff-Rose Music, Inc., 114 S. Ct. 1169-71 (1994). See Wald,
supra note 89, at 486.
173. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1168.
174. Id.
175. Id.
176. Id. at 1178-79.
177. Campbell, 114 S. Ct. at 1174. The Campbell Court criticized the appellate court
for transforming the presumption set out in Sony into a per se rule.
Cornell International Law Journal
verbatim copying of the original.178 The Court disposed of the near-dis-
positive weight given to factor four by the Harper & Row Court by recogniz-
ing that "market harm is a matter of degree, and the importance of this
factor will vary, not only with the amount of harm, but also with the rela-
tive strength of the showing on the other factors."179 Thus, although the
Campbell Court cited neither Sega nor Atari, its expanded application of
the four-factors test makes decompilation a much easier case for fair use.
Consequently, American case law evidences a trend toward the author-
ization of decompilation. Based on the crucial idea/expression distinction,
the fair-use test provides an affirmative defense for the copying necessary
for decompilation. Thus, Japan's assessment that its proposal authorizing
limited decompilation was consistent with existing U.S. law was correct.
C. European Law
The European Community has been concerned with the inconsistencies in
the intellectual property laws of its Member States since its inception. 180
Each of the EC member states has its own domestic approach to the protec-
tion of computersoftware.18 ' In its white paper, Completing the Internal
Market, intended as a blueprint for a single integrated internal market in
Europe, the European Commission stressed that the variation in intellec-
tual property regimes had a "direct and negative impact on intra-Commu-
nity trade and on the ability of enterprises to treat the common market as a
single environment for their economic activities."'1 2 Officials were con-
cerned that variations in protection resulted in uncertainties and distorted
competition. 183 A brief analysis of the laws of the individual Member
States as they existed prior to recent legislation provides a helpful back-
ground to the provisions of the recent EC legislation, the Council Directive
of 14 May 1991 on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs
(Directive).' 8 4
The Court of Appeals's elevation of one sentence from Sony to a per se rule runs
as much counter to Sony itself as to the long common-law tradition of fair use
adjudication. Rather, as we explained in Harper & Row, Sony stands for the
proposition that the "fact that a publication was commercial as opposed to non-
profit is a separate factor that tends to weigh against a finding of fair use."
Id. (quoting Harper & Row, Publishers, Inc., v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539, 562
(1985)).
178. Id. at 1177 ("When... the second use is transformative, market substitution is
at least less certain, and market harm may not be so readily inferred.").
179. Id. at 1177 n.21.
180. Completing the Internal Market: White Paper from the Commission to the Euro-
pean Council, COM(85)310 final at 37 [hereinafter Completing the Internal Market].
181. See infra Part II.C.1.
182. Completing the Internal Market, supra note 180, § 145. See Explanatory Memo-
randum to the Proposal for a Council Directive on the Legal Protection of Computer
Programs: COM(88)816 final-SYN 183, 1989 OJ. (C 91) 4, 6-7 [hereinafter Explana-
tory Memorandum], discussed in Christopher Voss, The Legal Protection of Computer Pro-
grams in the European Economic Community, 11 CoMPutr/Ld. 441, 442 n.12.
183. Voss, supra note 182, at 444.
184. Directive, supra note 3. The Commission submitted its original proposal to the
Council onJanuary 5, 1989. Commission Proposal for a Council Directive on the Legal
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European law established two threshold prerequisites for copyright
protection: (1) fixation of the expression in a permanent form and (2)
originality. 185 Because all Member States either explicitly recognized or
claimed to recognize that computer programs are fixed in a permanent
form, 186 the source of disparity among the various European laws centered
on the originality requirement.' 8 7 Originality is a decisive factor in deter-
mining the scope of protection since one must establish that the part cop-
ied was original before copyright protection is invoked. 188
1. Copyright Law of Member States
a. The United Kingdom
The United Kingdom recently adopted legislation which extends copyright
protection to computer programs as literary works.' 8 9 Case law has also
found copyright protection for computer software in both object and
source code.190 The Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act of 1988 (CDPA)
defines copying as reproducing the work in any material form, including
storing the work in any medium by electronic means and making interme-
diate copies that are incidental to some other use of the work' 91 Hence,
the CDPA would almost certainly designate reverse engineering as an
infringement.
The originality requirement in the United Kingdom is similar to that
Protection of Computer Programs, COM(88)816 rev. final-SYN 183, 1989 OJ. (C 91) 4
[hereinafter Proposal], discussed in Voss, supra note 182, at 446 n.32. Pursuant to the
Community's legislative cooperation procedure, which is governed by Article 149 of the
Treaty Establishing the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 149, 298
U.N.T.S. 1, 70, discussed in Voss, supra note 182, at 441 n.2, the Economic and Social
Committee delivered its opinion on the Proposal on October 18, 1989, Opinion on the
Proposal for a Council Directive on the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 1989
OJ. (C 329) 4, and the European Parliament voted in support of the proposal, as
amended, onJuly 11, 1990. Legislative Resolution Embodying the Opinion of the Euro-
pean Parliament on the Proposal from the Commission to the Council for a Directive on
the Legal Protection of Computer Programs, 1990 OJ. (C 231) 83. In light of the modi-
fications proposed by the Parliament, the commission submitted an amended proposal
to the Council on October 18, 1990, Amended Proposal for a Council Directive on the
Legal Protection of Computer Programs, COM(90)509 final, which shortly thereafter
adopted a common position on the legislation. Common Position Adopted by the Coun-
cil on 13 December 1990 with a view to the Adoption of a Directive on the Legal Protec-
tion of Computer Programs, Document 10652/1/90 (14 Dec. 1990). The Council
formally adopted the Directive on 14 May 1991. See generally Voss, supra note 182.
185. Paul G. Hidalgo, Copyright Protection of Computer Software in the European Com-
munity: Current Protection and the Effect of the Adopted Directive, 27 INT'L LAw. 113, 115
(1993).
186. Spoor, supra note 16, at 1065.
187. Id.
188. Id.
189. Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act, 1988, § 3(1)(b) (Eng.), discussed in Ehrlich,
supra note 79, at 1017.
190. Sega Enter. Ltd. v. Richards and Another, [19831 F.S.R. 73 (1982).
191. Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act, 1988, § 17(2), (6) (Eng.). Cf. 17 U.S.C.
§ 117 (1988). See supra text accompanying notes 119-79. In addition to complete con-
trol over reproduction, the author has exclusive control over authorizing adaptations to
the program. Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act, 1988, § 21 (Eng.).
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in the United States. 192 Although not specifically defined in the CDPA,
case law has set the standard at a low level. 193 The CDPA is similar to U.S.
copyright law in several additional respects. Although the idea/expression
distinction has never been recognized by statute, U.K. case law clearly
makes the distinction.194 Moreover, the CDPA contains a "fair dealing"
provision' 95 which allows copying literary works for the purposes of
research, private study, criticism, review, or reporting a current event, pro-
vided that sufficient acknowledgment of the work is included.196 It is
doubtful that this provision would have provided the basis for an affirma-
tive defense to a charge of reverse engineering infringement. 197 The U.S.
fair-use provision is more flexible than is the U.K. notion of fair dealing,
and therefore provides more room for balancing and an expansion of rele-
vant factors.198
b. Germany
Germany amended its Copyright Act in 1985 to extend copyright protec-
tion to computer programs as literary works. 199 The German Copyright
Act does not explicitly address the reverse-engineering issue. It does, how-
ever, require the permission of the author for any reproduction, exploita-
tion, or publication of a protected work 200 Because authors are granted
such broad exclusive rights and there are no statutory provisions, such as
archival copy or fair use, to permit even limited use without the author's
permission, it is unlikely that reverse engineering would be protected
under German law.
Article 2(2) of the German Copyright Act specifies that writings are
protected by copyright only if they meet the originality requirement of
"personal intellectual creatio[n]." 210  Recent cases from the Federal
Supreme Court of Germany have interpreted this to mean that the skills
needed to develop a program must be higher than those of an average
192. In Feist, the Supreme Court observed that the originality requirement in the
United States is low, but it is not nonexistent. The Court held that the compilation of an
alphabetized list of names accompanied by addresses and telephone numbers was so
mechanical as to be void of any originality. Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv.
Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340, 352-54 (1991).
193. See Interlego A.G. v. Tyco Indus. Inc., [1989] 1 App. Cas. 217 (P.C. 1988) (appeal
taken from H.K.) (holding that copyright law protects the independent product of an
author, which involves skill, labor, or other experience, and which is not a mere copy of
another work, with no significant additional features), discussed in Ehrlich, supra note
79, at 1017.
194. See, e.g., Hollinrake v. Truswell, 11894] 3 Ch 420.
195. Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act, 1988, §§ 29, 30 (Eng.). Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 107
(1988). See supra text accompanying notes 119-79. The U.K. fair-dealing provision
appears to be more limited than the U.S. fair-use doctrine, and probably would not have
encompassed decompilation.
196. Copyright, Designs, and Patents Act, 1988, §§ 29, 30 (Eng.).
197. Ehrlich, supra note 79, at 1017-18.
198. Spoor, supra note 16, at 1083.
199. Act Dealing with Copyright and Related Rights, § 2(1) (F.R.G.).
200. Id. §§ 15(1), 16.
201. Id. § 2(2).
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programmer.20 2 More recent opinions have reduced this standard to a
demonstration of intellectual effort.203 Imposition of such a standard
makes it unlikely that reverse engineering could be recognized as an
affirmative defense to a charge of infringement.
c. France
France also amended its Copyright Act to include computer programs
among copyrighted works,204 but the rights accorded to software differ
from those accorded to other copyrighted material. Although in the past
originality has required only "an intellectual creative process,"20 5 cases
have required that the program be both novel and inventive in order to
receive protection.20 6 Consequently, it is unlikely that reverse engineering
would be permitted under French law.
d. Other Member States
Spain recently adopted a comprehensive copyright statute dealing with the
protection of computer software.207 Protection extends explicitly to both
object and source code.208 Although reverse engineering is not specifically
mentioned, the Spanish provisions parallel those of the EC Directive. 209
Statutory law in Italy does not explicitly protect software, but courts
have held that "creative" software is protected.210 Denmark recently added
computer protection to its copyright statute.211 Belgium's current copy-
right law does not discuss computer software, but Belgium has stated that
it would be in favor of using copyright law to protect computer
software.212 Neither Luxembourg nor Portugal has statutes or case law on
the subject.2 13
This variation in the theory and extent of copyright protection for
202. E.g., BGHZ 94, 276 (Judgment of May 9, 1985, concerning Sudwestdeutsche
Inkasso KG v. Bappert & Burker Computer GmbH.), discussed in Ehrlich, supra note 79,
at 1016. See Fahle, supra note 90, at 667 n.81.
203. Ehrlich, supra note 79, at 1016.
204. Copyright Statute, Law No. 57-298,J.L. 4143 (Fr.), as amended by art. 1-V, Law
No. 85-660 OJ. 7495, translated in U.N. EDuc., SciEarNic AND CutrTua A. ORG., Er AL.,
COPYRIGHT LAws AND TREATIES OF THE WORLD (1992).
205. Hidalgo, supra note 185, at 123-24.
206. E.g., Cass. ass. plen., Mar. 7, 1986, Revue Internationale du Droit d'Auteur
(R.I.D.A.) 1986, 130 (concerning S.A. Babolat Maillot Witt v. Jean Pachot), discussed in
Fahle, supra note 90, at 668 n.92.
207. Ley de Propiedad Intelectual, (B.O.E., 1987, 27), arts. 10(1)(i), 96(1), 96(2),
(Sp.) translated in COPYRIGHT AND NEIGHBORING TRGrrs, LAws AND TmEATis (1988).
208. Id.
209. Directive, supra note 3.
210. Cass., 24 Nov. 1986, Giur. It. II, [1989] 1 F.S.R. 559 (concerning Societa Italiana
Degli Autori ed Editori (SIAE) v. Domenico Pompa) (noting that simple originality is not
enough), discussed in Fahle, supra note 90, at 669 n.99.
211. Copyright Amendment Act No. 378 of June 7, 1989 (Den.).
212. Green Paper on Copyright and the Challenge of Technology: Copyright Issues
Requiring Immediate Action, COM(88)172 final, § 5.3.9 [hereinafter Green Paper]. A
green paper is a working document drafted by the Commission addressing and seeking
commentary on a substantive issue of the proposed directive.
213. Id.
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software thwarts the goals of the common market.214 Inconsistent copy-
right protection for computer software discourages innovation and invest-
ment because the protection within the EC is only as strong as that
provided by the least protective Member State.215 Consequently, the Euro-
pean Community sought to harmonize the laws of the Member States.216
2. Prelude to the Adoption of the EC Directive
When differences in the domestic laws of the Member States have a nega-
tive effect on the Community as a whole, the Council of Members may
issue a Directive to be implemented by each Member State.217 In June,
1988, the Commission issued a Green Paper on Copyright and the Chal-
lenge of Technology.218 Emphasizing the importance of software to the
Community's economic development, the Commission explained the need
to unify protection of software. 219 After receiving and considering much
commentary, the Commission issued a Proposal for a Council Directive on
the Legal Protection of Computer Programs (Proposal). 220 Although the
Proposal was silent on the issue of reverse engineering, explicit restrictions
on software copying signaled disapproval of decompilation. 221 The Propo-
214. Proposal, supra note 184, pmbl., para. 5. "Certain differences in the legal protec-
tion of computer programs offered by the laws of the Member States have direct and
negative effects on the functioning of the common market." Directive, supra note 3,
pmbl.
215. See Proposal, supra note 184, pmbl., para. 5. "[Plhysical interconnection and
interaction is required to permit all elements of software and hardware to work with
other software and hardware and with users in all ways in which they are intended to
function." Directive, supra note 3, pmbl.; "Computer programs are playing an increas-
ingly important role in a broad range of industries and computer program technology
can accordingly be considered as being of fundamental importance for the Community's
industrial development." Id.
216. Id.
217. Treaty Establishing the EEC, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 189, 298 U.N.T.S. 1, 78. The
purpose of the European Community is "to promote throughout the Community a har-
monious development of economic activities, a continuous and balanced expansion, an
increased stability, an accelerated raising of the standard of living, and closer relations
between its Member States." Id. art. 2.
There are three legislative bodies of the EC: the Commission, the European Parlia-
ment, and the Council of Ministers. The Commission is a seventeen-member body with
one representative from each Member State and five additional representatives. It is
divided into Directorates General of varying size, which individually cover matters con-
cerning the EC, such as external relations and competition. The Commission initiates
EC action by submitting proposals to the Council, which is comprised of representatives
from the Member States and votes on legislation proposed by the Commission. The
Parliament is composed of 519 Members of the European Parliament, and this body
generally consults with the Commission and Council. PENELOPE KENT, EUROPEAN COM-
m-urry LAw (THE M+E HANDBOOK SEIms) 10-18 (1992).
218. Green Paper, supra note 212. The Green Paper recognized the shift in economic
activities away from the production of goods such as staple commodities toward the
production of technological goods. Id.
219. Id. at § 5.2. The Commission was as concerned with divergent judicial doctrines
controlling the protection of software as with divergent national legislation. Adoption of
a Community Directive effectively preempts national courts from interpreting national
laws. See id. at §§ 5.3.11, 5.6.2.
220. Proposal, supra note 184.
221. Id.
Vol. 29
1996 Japan's Retreat from Reverse Engineering
sal left open the possibility that some computer specifications might not
constitute ideas, but rather expressions, and consequently could not be
protected under copyright.222
Expected to be on the "fast track" to approval, 223 the Proposal instead
sparked an explosive debate in both the political and business arenas.224
The computer industry split along size lines. Small and medium-sized
companies, fearing a competitive disadvantage if reverse engineering were
to be prohibited, formed the European Committee for Interoperable Sys-
tems (ECIS). 225 Representatives from large software manufacturers joined
in the Software Alliance Group for Europe (SAGE). 226 ECIS argued that
smaller companies would be at a competitive disadvantage if they were not
allowed to use decompilation to analyze existing software and create inter-
operable counterparts. 227 SAGE responded that larger software producers
were economically benefitted by the creation of interoperable products,
and that private agreements between companies ensured that smaller com-
panies had the necessary information to create interoperable software. 228
Furthermore, SAGE contended that the unlimited copying authorized by
reverse engineering would reduce investment and discourage the develop-
ment of new software products.22 9
3. Provisions of the Directive
After much debate, the Council adopted the Directive of 14 May 1991 with
the full support of the Commission. 230 The Directive, which consists of ten
articles and a preamble, specifies that computer programs are protected by
copyright as literary works within the meaning of the Berne Convention. 231
222. Voss, supra note 182, at 457.
223. Id. at 446.
224. Ehrlich, supra note 79, at 1007-08.
225. Id. at 1008.
226. Id. at 1008-09.
227. Id.
228. Id.
229. Id. See also E. Brendan Magrab, Note, Computer Software Protection in Europe and
the EC Parliamentary Directive on Copyright for Computer Software, 23 L. & POL'Y INT'L
Bus. 709, 714 (1992).
230. Directive, supra note 3. One of the goals of the adoption of the Directive was to
align European software law with that of the United States. Pamela Samuelson, Compar-
ing U.S. and EC Copyright Protection for Computer Programs: Are They More Different
Than They Seem?, 13 J.L. & CoM. 279, 279 (1994). The European Community consulted
the United States when it debated the decompilation question. Acknowledging that the
Copyright Act does not specifically address reverse engineering, the U.S. government
stated that copying or reproducing a computer program without the permission of the
owner is not permitted unless excused by either the fair-use doctrine or as an archival
copy and that no court had found decompilation to be a fair use. Robert J. Hart, Inter-
faces, Interoperability and Maintenance, 13 Eup- INTELL. PROP. R y. 111, 113 (1991). The
U.S. government's response was prior to the Atari and Sega decisions.
231. Directive, supra note 3, art. 1(1); Berne Convention, supra note 13. The term
computer program is not defined in the Directive. Rather than risk obsolescence, the
Commission chose to recognize an evolving concept of the general subject matter.
Explanatory Memorandum, supra note 182, at (C 91) 5, 9. The Commission stated that
the term "should be taken to encompass the expression in any form, language, notation
or code of a set of instructions [both humanly perceivable and machine readable], the
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The only originality requirement is that the work be the author's own intel-
lectual creation.232 The author is granted the exclusive right to authorize
restricted acts such as reproduction, translation, adaptation, arrangement,
or any other alteration of a computer program, as well as the distribution
of the program.233
The Directive clearly mirrors U.S. copyright law.234 It recognizes the
idea/expression distinction;235 grants the copyright owner the exclusive
rights of reproduction, adaptation, and distribution;236 contains a first-sale
provision (which does not extend to the right of rental);237 and allows the
user to make a copy of the program necessary for its use.238 However, the
Directive does not contain a general fair-use provision.239 Moreover, the
Directive does not mention moral rights.24°
Article 6 of the Directive explicitly authorizes reverse engineering in
limited circumstances. 241 The Directive allows the rightful possessor of
software to decompile it "to achieve interoperability."242 This right, how-
purpose of which is to cause a computer to execute a particular task or function." Id. at
(C 91) 9. Cf. Green Paper, supra note 212, § 5.1 (stating that a computer program is a
"set of instructions the purpose of which is to cause an information processing device, a
computer, to perform its functions").
Although substantively the provisions remained the same, the Commission changed
some of the language in the Proposal to conform to the language of the Berne Conven-
tion. Hidaglo, supra note 185, at 136.
232. Directive, supra note 3, art. 1(3) ("A computer program shall be protected if it is
original in the sense that it is the author's own intellectual creation. No other criteria
shall be applied to determine its eligibility for protection.").
233. Id. art. 4.
234. The EC is "fully committed to the promotion of international standardization."
Id. pmbl. para. 9. U.S. law tends to be the most influential in matters of computer
software. "Governments in these countries look to the United States as a leader in this
area because our law is better developed; we've been pursuing case law in the software
protection area for much longer than most other [nations]." Hon.John M. Walker et al.,
Copyright Protection: Has Look and Feel Crashed?, 11 CARDozo ARTS & Er. LJ. 721, 749
(1993).
235. Directive, supra note 3, art. 1(2). Accord 17 U.S.C. § 102(b) (1988) ("In no case
does copyright protection for an original work of authorship extend to any idea, proce-
dure, process, system, method of operation, concept, principle, or discovery, regardless
of the form in which it is described, explained, illustrated, or embodied in such work.").
236. Directive, supra note 3, art. 4. Accord 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988).
237. Directive, supra note 3, art. 4(c). Accord 17 U.S.C. § 109(a) (Supp. 11I 1991) ("the
owner of a particular copy or phonorecord lawfully made under this title, or any person
authorized by such owner, is entitled, without the authority of the copyright owner, to
sell or otherwise dispose of the possession of that copy or phonorecord").
238. Directive, supra note 3, art. 5(1). Accord 17 U.S.C. § 117(2) (1988).
239. Voss, supra note 182, at 452. See also Explanatory Memorandum, supra note
182, at (C 91) 11, which incorrectly characterizes the concept as permissible copying of
"insubstantial parts" of a work
240. Voss, supra note 182, at 443 n.13. Cf. Japanese Copyright Act, supra note 44, at
§ 3, art. 18 (recognizing moral rights of an author).
241. Directive, supra note 3, art. 6. The limited authorization of reverse engineering
was the product of extensive debate within the European Community. Critics claim that
it is an ineffective compromise. See Vanessa Marsland, Copyright Protection and Reverse
Engineering of Software-An EC/UK Perspective, 19 U. DAYrON L. REv. 1021, 1042 (1994).
242. Directive, supra note 3, art. 6(1)(b). Interoperabiity is "defined as the ability to
exchange information and mutually to use the information which has been exchanged"
Vol. 29
1996 Japan's Retreat from Reverse Engineering
ever, is limited. First, the rightful possessor has no right to decompile
where the information necessary to achieve the interoperability is readily
available.2 43 Second, decompilation may not "be used for goals other than
to achieve the interoperability of the independently created computer pro-
gram."244 Third, the right to decompile is limited to "obtain[ing] the infor-
mation,"2 45 which may not then "be used for the development, production,
or marketing of a computer program substantially similar in its expres-
sion" to the original (decompiled) program.2 46 Significantly, the Directive
does not define the term "substantially similar."24 7
Much of the wording of Article 6 is the product of political compro-
mise, and thus determination of disputed provisions is left to the European
Court of Justice.24 8 Understandably, European courts have been
extremely reluctant to apply the reverse engineering section of the Direc-
tive. The Council's failure to define the key factors used to determine
whether reverse engineering is permitted (e.g., "substantial similarity")
makes it difficult for courts to know where to begin. In fact, when a recent
case presented the issue of decompilation of computer software, the court
ignored the Directive entirely, even though it had gone into effect two
months prior to the decision.24 9 Instead, the court relied on both the Sega
and Atari decisions for guidance.2 50
Despite the uncertainty of application, the EC Directive is strikingly
consistent with emerging U.S. law. The restrictions imposed on decompi-
lation by the Directive essentially mirror the guidelines set out by the Ninth
Circuit in Sega: that the information be necessary and not otherwise avail-
able.25 1 Thus, the pillars of international copyright law, the United States
and the European Community, as guided by the Berne Convention, indi-
cate an increasing acceptance of decompilation within the international
community.
and refers to "functional interconnection and interaction," Id. pmbl. para. 12, which is
necessary for "all elements of software and hardware to work with other software and
hardware." Id. pmbl. para. 10.
243. Id. art. 6(1)(b). Note that this is the same restriction upon which the court in
Sega relied.
244. Directive, supra note 3, art. 6(2)(a).
245. Id. art. 6(1).
246. Id. art. 6(2)(c).
247. In U.S. copyright law, the term substantial similarity is a term of art. When a
plaintiff cannot show that a defendant copied directly, he may prove infringement by
showing (1) that the defendant had access to the plaintiffs work and (2) that defendant's
work is "substantially similar" to plaintiffs original work See, e.g., Feist Publications.,
Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., Inc., 499 U.S. 340 (1991).
248. Spoor, supra note 16, at 1070-71.
249. John Richardson Computers, Ltd. v. Flanders and Another, [1993] F.S.R. 497
(1993).
250. Id.
251. Sega Ent. Ltd. v. Accolade, Inc., 977 F.2d 1510, 1527 (1993). See supra text
accompanying notes 150-71. In contrast to U.S. copyright law, however, the Directive
explicitly prohibits reverse engineering limitation clauses in contracts. Directive, supra
note 3, pmbl., para. 26 ("any contractual provisions contrary to Article 6 ... should be
null and void"). The U.S. Copyright Act contains no similar provision. See generally 17
U.S.C. §§ 101 et seq. (1988).
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III. Japan's Position on Reverse Engineering
A. The Japanese Approach
1. Cultural Background
Any attempt to compare Japanese and Westem 25 2 law must begin by
observing the legal implications of the different social structures. Despite
Western influence over a democratic Japan for more than a century, Japan
has resisted the extreme legalization that Western cultures, such as the
United States, have undergone. 25 3 Because litigious individuals are per-
ceived as disrupting social harmony in Japan, public disputes are discour-
aged and controversies are often resolved privately. 254 Thus, results of
legal battles in Japan are more uncertain, particularly if one of the partici-
pants is more highly respected than the other, giving the first an obvious
advantage in any legal proceeding.25 5 This aversion to controversy is
reflected. in Japan's Copyright Act, which emphasizes codification over
judicial construction to resolve conflict over the extent of protection for
computer software.25 6 Consequently, while the Japanese Copyright Act
specifically lists protections and exceptions from protections, it provides
little direction for courts deciding questions that do not fall clearly within a
rule.2 5 7 Despite this incongruity in approach, Japan and Western states
have adopted strilingly similar methods for protecting computer
software.25 8 For example, consistent with Western law, Japanese copyright
law is based on the idea/expression dichotomy.25 9
2. Japanese Copyright Law
Japan promulgated its first Copyright Law in 1899, the year in which it
became a party to the Berne Convention.2 60 In 1962 the Ministry of Educa-
tion set up a committee to discuss the copyright system, 26 ' and in 1971 the
Copyright Act was amended for the purpose of protecting the rights of
authors and providing for cultural enrichment. 26 2 The Japanese govern-
ment and computer industry began debating intellectual property protec-
tion for computer software in the 1970s. 263 A special committee was
appointed by Japan's Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI)
252. For purposes of this Note, "Western" includes American and Western European
nations.
253. Mark S. Lee, Japan's Approach to Copyright Protection for Computer Software, 16
Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. LJ. 675, 677 (1994).
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. See generally Japanese Copyright Act, supra note 44.
257. Lee, supra note 253, at 696.
258. Id.
259. Zentaro Kitagawa, Legal Protection of Computer Program: An Outline, in 4 DOING
BusINEss IN JAPAN Pt. VI, Ch. 9, § 9.02[4] (Zentaro Kitagawa ed., 1996).
260. MAsAauRA KATSUMOTO, DAs NEuEJAPANISCHE UHEBERREcH-rsGIsrrz: THE NEwJAP-
ANESE COPYIGHT LAw 117 (1975), discussed in Kitagawa, supra note 259.
261. This committee subsequently became a separate department, the Agency for
Cultural Affairs. KATsUMOTO, supra note 260, at 120.
262. Id. at 121.
263. Lee, supra note 253, at 690.
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in December 1983 to explore the issue. 264 Meanwhile, Japanese courts
began to give protection to computer software. 265
Japan amended its Copyright Act in 1985, and these amendments clar-
ified the copyright protection provided to computer software.266 The
amendments defined program work as "an expression of combined instruc-
tions given to a computer for the purpose of obtaining a specific result by
operating the computer."2 67 Like the European Directive, the Japanese Act
proscribes infringement in the case of "substantial similarity," but fails to
articulate a standard for evaluating expression within this framework.2 68
The Japanese Copyright Act gives authors of protected works more
rights than are specified in the U.S. Copyright Act, including: (1) a repro-
duction right; (2) a performance right; (3) a broadcast right; (4) a recita-
tion right; (5) an exhibition right; (6) a distribution and public showing
right for cinematographic works; (7) a rental right for copies of a work,
except for cinematographic copies; and (8) a translation right.269
The Japanese Act also provides that the protection provided for a "pro-
gram work" does not extend to the programming language, rules, or algo-
rithms used to create it.2 7 0 Article 10 specifies three limitations on the
protection provided to software:
The protection granted by this Law to [program] works ... shall not extend
to any programming language, rule or algorithm used for making such
works. In this case, the following terms shall have the meaning hereby
assigned to them respectively
(1) "Programming language" means characters and other signs and the
system thereof which are used as the means to express a program.
(2) "Rules" mean the special conventions in a specific program with
regard to the use of the programming language referred to in the
preceding item.
264. Id.
265. Japanese courts extended the protection of the Copyright Act to computer pro-
grams while the debate coninued. The cases found computer software to be a "work"
within the meaning of the Act, and that the definition of reproduction under Article
2(1)(xv) of the Act was broad enough to cover reproductions of computer source code.
See Judgment of Dec. 6, 1982, Tokyo District Court (Taito Co. v. I.N.G. Enters.), 1060
HANJI 18; Judgment of Mar. 30, 1983, Yokohama District Court (Taito Co. v. Makoto
Denshikogyo Co.), 1081 HANJI 125; Judgment of Jan. 26, 1984, Osaka District Court
(Konami Kogyo Co. v. Daiwa Co.), 1106 HANJI 134. See Lee, supra note 253, at 690.
266. Bayha, supra note 7, at 190.
267. Japanese Copyright Act, supra note 44, art. 2.
268. Kitagawa, supra note 259, at § 9.02[4].
269. Japanese Copyright Act, supra note 44, arts. 21-27. Cf. 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1988),
which lists four rights protected under the U.S. Copyright act: rights to (1) reproduc-
tion; (2) distribution; (3) derivative work right as to all copyrights; and (4) public per-
formance and public display rights for certain types of works. In general, the Japanese
Act contains a greater specification of rights.
270. Japanese Copyright Act, supra note 44, art. 10, para. 3.
U.S. copyright law does not contain any similar statutory restrictions. Instead, the
United States relies on case law or U.S. Copyright Office policy to guide application of
copyright law to these specific elements of computer programs.
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(3) "Algorithm" means the method to combine instructions to the com-
puter in respect to a program.
27 1
The Japanese Copyright Act contains a limited fair-use provision. It
allows copying or modification for personal use, but does not extend to
research, study, or commercial use.2 72 Instead, the Act identifies a number
of specific limitations and compulsory licenses. Specified limitations
include:
1. reproduction for private use, unless the reproduction is made by an auto-
matic reproduction machine placed for public use;
2. reproduction of library materials for certain non-profit activities;
3. limited quotations;
4. limited reproductions or broadcasts in schools, school textbooks, or
school education programs;
5. reporting of current events;
6. reproduction for judicial proceedings; and
7. other matters.2 73
3. Application
Consistent with the language of the Act, several Japanese cases have held
that literally copying code infringes a program's copyright. 274 Japan's
courts have confirmed that copyright protection in a program work does
not extend to the algorithms used in making the programs. In System Sci-
ence v. Japan Technato, the Tokyo High Court indicated that the algorithm
exception means that there is no copyright protection for the basic struc-
tural design revealed by examination of the program.27 5
Although the "rules" provision of Article 10 has not been construed by
the courts, Government officials have interpreted it to "eliminate protection
for interface information and methods."276 A representative of the Cul-
tural Affairs Agency stated:
In making a program, in addition to the conventions applicable to the pro-
gram language, it is sometimes necessary to follow specific conventions for
the purpose of using the program in connection with a different program in
the same computer or with a program in another computer through the
medium of communication circuits. All these conventions are included
within the term "rules."2 77
271. Japanese Copyright Act, supra note 44, art. 10, para. 3.
272. Lee, supra note 253, at 695.
273. Japanese Copyright Act, supra note 44, arts. 30-49. "Other matters" refers to the
narrow exceptions created for certain types of uses, such as broadcast station's right to
make ephemeral recordings of works they have a right to broadcast, Id. art. 44, or adver-
tising for exhibition of artistic works. Id. art. 47. These provisions do not affect the
author's moral rights in the works being copied. Id. art. 50.
274. See, e.g., Judgment of Mar. 31, 1989, Tokyo District Court (System Science Corp.
v. Japan Technato, Co.), 130 HANJI, aff'd in part, rev'd in part, Judgment of Tokyo High
Court, June 20, 1989, discussed in Lee, supra note 253, at 693.
275. Id.
276. Lee, supra note 253, at 694.
277. K. Bandou, The Copyright Law Amendments-Clarifying the Protections of Com-
puter Programs, 334 MBL 18, 20 (1985), quoted in Lee, supra note 253, at 694.
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Thus, much like the situation in the European Community, the status
of reverse engineering is unclear under existing law.
B. Legality of Japan's Proposal
As an analysis of the Beme Convention and U.S. and EC law makes clear,
the emerging trend in international law is the authorization of limited
decompilation. Like the United States and the EC, Japan is a signatory of
the Berne Convention and, by treaty as well as national legislation, pro-
vides copyright protection for computer software as a literary work.2 78
Japan also bases copyright protection on the distinction between ideas and
expressions, the theory used by both the United States and the EC for
authorizing decompilation. 279 Thus, the limited form of decompilation
proposed by Japan was consistent with existing international norms.
By compelling Japan to withdraw its proposal to authorize decompila-
tion, the United States has disrupted a clearly emerging international
trend. In light of the fact that one of the purposes of both the EC Directive
and the Japanese proposal was to harmonize international law on the pro-
tection of computer software, the United States has effectively sanctioned
its own advantage in the international software market.
The U.S. concern that decompilation might become a widespread
activity is understandable, particularly given recent technological innova-
tions. Although many commentators argue that decompilation will never
be widespread because of the investment of skill, time, and money neces-
sary to successfully decompile a program,280 new technology calls this pre-
sumption into question. New tools, such as computer-aided software
engineering, may permit inexpensive and efficient graphic analysis of
programs.2 81
Moreover, the lack of certainty over precisely when decompilation
would be permitted creates a dangerous climate for the mass legalization of
decompilation across the globe. Although the Directive and the Sega deci-
sion set forth similar tests for permitting decompilation, neither distinctly
sets forth when decompilation would or would not be permitted. Conse-
quently, software developers have no clear guidance as to when their
actions would be protected. Given the novelty of the issue and the scarce
case law, it is doubtful that courts will develop a consistent approach for
some time.
2 8 2
Nevertheless, given that Japan's proposal was clearly within the limits
established by both U.S. case law and the EC Directive, such pointed oppo-
sition to the proposal only serves to increase the confusion. It is true that
for the United States there is much to lose in a more open software market,
278. See supra text accompanying notes 260-77.
279. See supra text accompanying notes 260-77.
280. SeeJohnson-Laird, supra note 26, at 901. See also supra text accompanying notes
36-40.
281. Ehrlich, supra note 79, at 1039-1040; Samuelson, supra note 40, at 2342.
282. Ehrlich, supra note 79, at 1037. It is unlikely thatJapan will consider the decom-
pilation issue again in the near future. Bahya, supra note 7, at 191.
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but there is much at stake for other nations as well. The United States
should not seek to prevent others from what it allows for itself.
Conclusion
Japan's retreat from its proposal to authorize limited decompilation was
unnecessary. U.S. and EC copyright law, under the umbrella of the Berne
Convention, permit reverse engineering in the limited context proposed by
Japan. Moreover, Japan's Copyright Act contains the same theoretical con-
structs used by the United States and the European Community to author-
ize reverse engineering. The United States may have succeeded in blocking
the proposal, but its opposition was clearly wrong.
